The EU-funded PARTES project ("Participatory approaches to protecting places of worship") has continuously assessed the developing terrorism threat landscape of European places of worship (PoW). By summer 2023, findings suggested that the most common threats were unsophisticated, low-level incidents, such as vandalism and graffiti, with perpetrators remaining largely unknown and unpunished. Despite these attacks, there was little evidence to suggest a direct connection to jihadist activity, which has typically involved more violent actions aimed at causing casualties.
However, following the events of 7 October 2023 (7/10), concerns among European authorities, experts and religious communities increased significantly. With the eruption of a major armed conflict, in which religion plays a crucial role historically, legitimate concerns emerged about the impact on the security of European PoW. Societal tensions soared, and both anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hate speech and hate crimes skyrocketed. Based on past patterns related to many Europan citizens’ shared religious identity with conflict parties and civilian victims, many expected that these geopolitical developments would also translate into a significantly elevated jihadist threat against Jewish PoW.
This blog post takes a closer look at whether this has indeed materialised by analysing recent jihadist attacks and plots targeting religious communities in Europe based on a comprehensive in-house dataset. The author argues that (1) a simple discourse-based approach to the security of PoW is insufficient and risky, (2) deterrence remains a key aspect of protecting religious communities, justifying its costs not in spite, but precisely because of the lack of successful terror attacks, and that (3) a better balance needs to be achieved in terms of protective and preventive measures long-term. To stay ahead of threats and be able to proactively take adequate measures, religious communities should work closely with experts that not only have access to relevant data, but also have the skills and experience to interpret the numbers.
The text provides an overview of relevant data about the prevalence and motive of jihadist attacks and plots against religious communities in Europe, differentiating between incidents before and after 7/10. It adds further context by briefly introducing the propaganda of major jihadist organisations that attempted to exploit these geopolitical developments to incite violence. The introduced data is then analysed, elaborating on the reasons and implications related to the recent threat landscape of religious communities in Europe. The entry concludes with recommendations and foresight regarding the security of European PoW based on the insights.
While this blog post focuses on the jihadist threat, the author acknowledges that the recent geopolitical developments also largely affected the safety and security of Muslim communities. Jihadism is only one side of the coin that predominantly targets Jewish and Christian PoW, though exceptions exist considering the strongly sectarian ideology of the currently dominant jihadist organisation, the so-called Islamic State (or Da’esh). Reflecting on the latest threats against Muslim PoW goes beyond the scope of this text but is worthy of its own analysis.
A new chapter in jihadism: 7/10 and its exploitation by global terrorist organisations
On 7 October 2023, Palestinian jihadist factions in Gaza led by Hamas launched an unprecedented large-scale terror attack on Israel, killing 1200 people and taking 251 hostages, starting a war between the two parties. Shortly after, Israel engaged in an extensive counter-offensive in Gaza, resulting in extensive destruction and civilian casualties. Hezbollah also joined hostilities in support of Palestinian factions, which has gradually grown into an overt armed conflict in Lebanon over time.
Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, the two major jihadist organisations globally, have both put immense efforts into exploiting the conflict in Gaza for their purposes. Recognising the opportunity provided by the societal tensions and the explicit visual material coming out of the conflict zone, both groups have intensified their propaganda to mobilise supporters around Gaza and the issue of Palestine. Much of this material focused on inciting hatred and violence against Jews. Da’esh even launched a specific campaign they titled “Kill them wherever you find them” in early 2024, not only calling on supporters to target Jews and Christians wherever they are but also providing specific instructions on how to carry out attacks.
Increase in sectarian targeting since 7/10, but baselines remain low
As data shows, religious communities had not been prevalent targets of jihadists before 7/10 in Europe despite their status as perceived ideological adversaries of major jihadist organisations. About 9% of attacks between January 2014 and 7 October 2023, and 19% of foiled plots between January 2022 and 7 October 2023 targeted them.
These numbers have notably increased after the terror attack by Hamas on Israel and the subsequent armed conflict in Gaza. While the numbers do not quite justify the increase to be described as a surge, the share of plots targeting Jews has almost tripled to 28,9%. The share of attacks targeting Jews also followed suit, increasing to 18,2%. A 15-year-old Swiss Da’esh supporter stabbed an Orthodox Jew on the streets of Zürich in March 2024. It is worth noting that based on the information publicly known so far, the perpetrator made no direct references to Palestine, but did consciously target Jews. On 5 September 2024, another perpetrator, who had earlier spread Da’esh propaganda, carried out an unsuccessful shooting at the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism right next to the Israeli Consulate in Munich, Germany, on the anniversary of the 1972 attack during the Munich Olympics. The timing and location of the attack strongly imply that Israel and/or Jews in general were the intended targets. The attacker was stopped and shot by police who were guarding the Israeli consulate.
Of these 11 plots targeting Jews since 7/10, only 36,3% intended to attack synagogues, with the rest planning to attack alternative Jewish targets instead. Similarly, neither of the two attacks on Jews since 7/10 targeted PoW.
* The data covers 109 jihadist attacks in Europe (EU-27 + UK, Norway, Switzerland) between 1/1/2014 and 7/10/2023; and 21 foiled jihadist plots in the same spatial scope between 1/1/2022 and 7/10/2023.
** The data covers 11 jihadist attacks and 38 foiled jihadist plots in Europe (EU-27 + UK, Norway, Switzerland) between 8/10/2023 and 21/10/2024.
*** Christmas markets were coded as symbolic Christian targets
The data also suggests an increase in the targeting of Christian communities. This has already translated into an attack, after the perpetrator of the stabbing attack in Solingen, Germany, claimed to be specifically targeting Christians based on the credit claim published by Da’esh. Overall in this period, attacks against Christians are slightly up from 6,4% to 9,1%, and the share of plots targeting them has almost doubled from 9,5% to 18,4%. While this may initially seem unrelated to the Middle East, there is likely a direct link: the narrative on Gaza by Da’esh tied Israel to the West, and Jews to Christians. Historically, the group and its supporters argued, Jews have been allied with Christians against Muslims, which they said is also reflected in how the West (as a collective, perceived by Da’esh as Christian) currently supports and even arms Israel.
Another metric suggesting that the conflict in the Middle East had a strong impact on the jihadist scene is the reported motives behind recent attacks. Based on the author’s in-house dataset, five out of the ten perpetrators of jihadist attacks since 7/10 referenced Gaza to differing extents as a motive behind their acts. On top of that, both the Zürich and the Munich attacks, though no direct reference was made, are highly likely to have been motivated by the war in Gaza given their target selection. These findings provide support to the hypothesis that the recent increase in jihadi activities in Europe is overwhelmingly driven by the war in Gaza, which in turn should logically result in the majority of attacks and plots having Israeli and Jewish targets. Yet, the fact that there’s only been a slight uptick in the targeting of the Jewish community does not seem to match this thesis, the intensity of jihadist propaganda, or the gravity of the situation in the Middle East that has been dominating headlines. The contrast between the high share of motives referencing Gaza and the increased but still fairly low share of plots and attacks with Jewish targets is glaring.
Deterrence and the security paradox
Currently, available data on these plots and attacks is scarce and thus insufficient to establish the definite cause for the discrepancy: why are Jewish targets and especially PoW not the majority of targets since 7/10 despite the heightened activity likely being mostly driven by the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which is also exploited by terrorist propaganda? One of the most likely reasons is deterrence. Shortly after 7/10, most European countries implemented increased security measures to protect vulnerable communities that would most likely be targeted, including Jewish PoW. A key part of that is the stationing of law enforcement officers or soldiers — depending on the legal circumstances, tactical details, and available resources — in the direct vicinity of PoW, or, in some cases, the intensification of law enforcement patrols around such objects.
Despite some criticism, this measure is not merely symbolic. It has been proven to harden the target and require careful planning by attackers to overcome. One of the latest IS-inspired plots against a synagogue in France was prevented from materialising because the police patrol scared the suspect away. The Munich attack, which presumably intended to target the Israeli consulate, ended up not only being stopped by police stationed as guards but was also likely forced to deviate from the originally selected target.
However, such deterrence measures also come with major costs at times when personnel resources are already strained, and its impact on the perception of safety among the community is not straightforward either: religious communities may feel safer knowing that security personnel is around, but they may also feel unsafe as the presence of such personnel explicitly signals that there is a serious threat. Some call this the terrorism tax, though the jury is still out on the effect of visible security measures on the perception of safety. As a trade-off, the hardening of PoW as targets also incentivises the targeting of religious community members in public, away from PoW, where they enjoy little to no protection, as evidenced by the numbers above. Confidential findings of the PARTES project support this claim, too.
Christian PoW are also affected by the strong deterrence at Jewish PoW. While Jewish PoW remain the primary ideological targets currently, their protective measures may force some jihadists to resort to attacking Christian PoW instead. Churches are still seen as ideologically justified targets in the current context due to their alleged links to Jews and Israel, and they also have symbolic value. However, they lack the same level of protective deterrence, making them an easier target.
In this context, it is important to be aware of the security paradox as well: deterrence and further measures taken may be the reason why tensions do not translate into successful attacks or even concrete threats against Jewish PoW. The low number of plots and lethal attacks against PoW should however not be used to justify the reduction or abolishment of such measures, despite the lack of headlines making the public aware of the importance of protecting PoW. Although the threat landscape is mirrored in plots and attacks, it is not exclusively made up of them, which is where propaganda, chatter, and protective measures, among other factors, come into the picture. These factors clearly suggest an elevated threat against Jewish PoW.
The way forward: data-based threat models that allow proactive measures, complemented by long-term prevention
Since the outbreak of a regional war in the Middle East, PoW in Europe have been dealing with a wide variety of threats, including hate crimes, terrorism, and cyber-attacks. Now more than ever, the security of PoW is a highly complex matter that requires a careful, evidence-based approach by experts who have the skills and experience to interpret the data.
This blog post demonstrated the importance of looking at the data before acting upon assumptions that sound straightforward. While many expected that the war in Gaza and the related propaganda campaign by major terrorist organisations would lead to significantly increased targeting of Jewish communities, this is only true to a limited extent. At the same time, the targeting of Christian communities appears to have slightly increased, too, which may have come unexpectedly and might not even be widely known. The lack of additional protective measures taken not only leaves Christian PoW exposed, but also makes them a more attractive target in the first place.
Threat assessments for religious communities should therefore consider broader trends beyond their own community and regularly update their threat models, ideally together with authorities and experts. It is crucial to pay attention to complexity and avoid oversimplifying analyses. What major terrorist organisations say is not to be ignored or taken lightly, but it should not be taken blindly as a certainty either. Even concrete attack instructions do not automatically translate to actual threats or action. At the same time, the sustained propaganda still elevated the threat against Christians, even though they are not a party to the conflict. Whether such instructions are followed or not may well also depend on deterrence.
Measures are best taken preventively and proactively based on data-driven foresight. The reasons for the most likely scenario (surge in jihadists picking Jewish targets) not materialising require further analysis and discussions. However, openly available information indicates that deterrence might be a key contributor: the heightened security measures around Jewish PoW may explain the (in this context) low number of jihadist attacks and plots against them. Simultaneously, one needs to be cautious not to fall victim to the security paradox: the absence of a surge in plotting against and attacking Jewish PoW should not be used to justify cuts to security budgets and measures. Ensuring the safety of PoW in the current dynamic threat environment necessitates comprehensive analysis and understanding of a multitude of factors, as well as adequate funding for the protective measures to the extent such analyses call for.
These measures should however also be complemented by more general, holistic prevention and awareness-raising efforts to reduce the pool of individuals that even think about carrying out an attack in the first place. As explained above, deterrence is effective but costly to implement and maintain in the long run, particularly considering the number of churches in Europe that would require additional protection. While hard and soft security measures need to go hand-in-hand and will always rely on each other, there needs to be a shift towards better balancing the two elements if European governments seek to achieve sustainable security at PoW.
Erik Hacker is Researcher at SCENOR focusing on violent extremism, terrorism and radicalisation, especially on the web, its structures, dynamics and discourses. He holds an LL.M. of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in law and politics of international security and a BA in political science of the University of Vienna.